In this paper we examine the adequacy of the concept of Physician Order Entry (POE) as a model for clinical systems, and suggest an alternative understanding of the order creation and communication process. We argue that the model is important because the difficulties that arise are not limited to the semantics of discourse about POE, but can be deeply embedded in the semantics of clinical systems for POE. The result can be unexpected consequences which at best may make patient care more difficult, and at worst may make care less safe.
Introduction
In this paper we examine the concept of Physician Order Entry (POE), consider the adequacy of this concept as a model for computer systems, and suggest an alternative understanding of the order creation and communication process. To provide a basis for this examination of POE, we first discuss 1) the importance and impact of mental models; 2) the influence of language and metaphor in communicating or revealing these models; and 3) the differing levels of organization at which human cognition and computer interaction can be understood.
We next illustrate the importance of these concepts by providing examples of problems that arise when technologies are based on incomplete or incorrect models of underlying processes.
Finally, we discuss some implications of POE and the implicit model it suggests, and compare this to examples of the more complex and more robust process of creating, communicating, and coordinating a collective understanding of what is wrong, what should be done, and what can be expected to happen (1) . 1 The ideas expressed in this paper have arisen out of systematic observation primarily in acute care hospital settings, combined with informal observations drawn from the authors' clinical experience. Elsewhere published are more detailed descriptions of methods and findings of the research out of which this paper has arisen, including investigations of expert information use in critical care (2) (3) (4) and physician order entry in the United States. (5-7).
Background

Models, Explicit and Implicit
Whether implicit or explicit, models or theories have a powerful influence on how we interpret and respond to the world. In healthcare, our models of health and healthcare processes determine what we observe, how we interpret our observations, and how we use this understanding to respond to health and disease. When models are explicit, their effects on our understandings and actions are usually apparent, but as Alderson noted, "when theories are implicit their power to clarify or to confuse, and to reveal or obscure new insights, can work unnoticed (8) ."
The impact of models, whether explicit or implicit, is especially important in the design of information technology (IT). In business applications, successful design, implementation, and integration of IT depend critically on an accurate and robust understanding of the processes they are meant to facilitate (9) . In healthcare, Goorman and Berg describe the difficulties healthcare workers face (hindered workflow, increased workload, less overview) when designers of an EMR conceptualize doctors' and nurses' work in a manner that clashes with the everyday realities of the work (10) . In other domains such as aviation, where high reliability performance must be achieved in spite of uncertainty and unpredictability, systems meant to assist decision makers have been shown to actually impair performance when based on incomplete or inaccurate understanding of the processes involved. Woods and Patterson observe that "Despite the fact that these systems are often justified on the grounds that they would help offload work from harried practitioners, we find that they in fact create new additional tasks, force the user to adopt new cognitive strategies, require more knowledge and more communication, at the very times when the practitioners are most in need of true assistance (11)."
Language and Metaphor
Models, even implicit and informal ones, may reveal themselves in the language we use in everyday discourse. Like models, language itself can have a strong influence on our ways of thinking about and reacting to our experiences. The American humorist George Carlin illustrated this in his celebrated comparison of the language used to describe American baseball and football (12) , summarized in Table 1 . More recently, authors have expressed concern about the ramifications of the market metaphor and the language associated with it in discussions of U.S. healthcare (13) and health policy (14) . Table 1 here As Malone explains, "Words, in this view, do not merely label things; they maintain and modify the kinds of common understandings that set up our possibilities for action…" (14) .
Consider, for example, some of the language used in the discourse of information system implementations, much of it borrowed from the diffusion of innovations literature (see Table   2 ). In these discussions, the terms that are used to describe the proponents and implementers of the system have very different connotations from those that are used to describe the intended users, especially if those users are not enthusiastic about the system being implemented. These words suggest implicit constructs, positive and negative, about the people involved. These words may suggest or even contribute to an adversarial relationship between them. DiBello has described how reframing the problem can facilitate the introduction of new technologies in the workplace (15) . Language in such instances can be as important in creating the reality as in describing it. Language, and the underlying constructs and assumptions reflected in that language, can enrich and empower or distort and constrain, depending on one's choice of words. Table 2 here
Cognition: Individual, Social, and Distributed
A third bit of background concerns extant views or models of cognition, and the need for information system design to occur at an organizational level that corresponds to the processes the system is meant to facilitate. Historically, computer system and interface design has been based on a one user-one computer assumption, an assumption that pervades system design even today. Informed by research on individual human cognition, great advances have been made in the design of human computer interaction, resulting in improvements in usability and in the usefulness of computer tools for individuals.
For some processes, however, social cognition, rather than individual cognition, may be a better model on which to base information system design. Even where multiple individuals are involved, computer systems generally deal with them as individuals, one at a time.
Decision support systems based on models of individual human decision making may enhance decisions by each person in isolation, but may be inadequate for those decisions that emerge from collaboration among members of a group. In support of this view, Bowker emphasizes the need to 'scale up' our approach: "The model is no longer about one person, or a small team, optimizing decisions in a controlled environment. At the organizational level, deciding includes issues of social justice, multiple interpretations, and adjudication of conflict across social boundaries (16)."
A still broader view of cognitive processes is that of distributed cognition. According to this perspective cognition (information processing) is accomplished not by an individual mind nor by a group acting collectively, but rather by an activity system comprised of individuals and technologies which together transform information through culturally defined and communicated practices. This growing area of inquiry has been especially important to improving understanding of the interaction among humans and technologies, including computers, in the performance of complex tasks in naturalistic settings such as aviation (17, 18) and navigation (19) . Again, information systems based on notions of individual cognition may be inadequate to support, and may even interfere with, information processing tasks for which distributed cognition is the more appropriate level of understanding.
Examples from Healthcare
In medicine it is not difficult to find examples of models that formed the basis for technologies which at first were promising but which ultimately failed to help and may have actually harmed patients. High level oxygen treatment was believed to be beneficial for newborns, but ultimately was found to be associated with retrolental fibroplasia and blindness. Ligation of the left internal mammary artery was performed as a rational therapy for angina pectoris, until trials showed that it had no effect. A variety of drugs were routinely used to control cardiac arrhythmias, until evidence showed they often do more harm than good. These are but a few examples of interventions that made sense at the time, but ultimately were proven not to be beneficial at best and harmful at worst.
In each case, the technology or intervention was developed based on the best science of the day. Each incorporated what were at the time the accepted models of underlying pathophysiologic processes. In each case these models were used as the rationale for promoting the technology or treatment: "It must work, because it makes sense that it works." Yet in each case accumulated clinical experience, controlled trials, or advances in the underlying science eventually led the technology to fall out of fashion.
Incorrect models not only lead us to employ technologies that are not beneficial, they sometimes lead us to withhold interventions that actually work. Goodwin and Goodwin (20) describe this phenomenon, giving examples of three therapies (aspirin, colchicine, and gold) that were discarded because new theories of pathophysiology suggested that they shouldn't work, despite abundant clinical evidence that they do work. A more recent example is that of beta adrenergic blocking agents in patients with heart failure. For decades, our models of the pathophysiology of heart failure and of the actions of these agents made it 'obvious' that they would be harmful to patients with this condition. Yet current evidence tells us the opposite is true: patients with heart failure experience lower mortality when these agents are used (21) and our long-held view to the contrary has prevented patients from receiving this benefit.
Examples from Medical Informatics
Health informatics also offers examples of technologies that, based on incomplete understanding of underlying processes, have failed to produce expected improvements.
Diagnostic decision support systems, based on what has been called the "Oracle at Delphi" model, were the focus of decades of research in major informatics centers. These systems ultimately had less impact on practice than was hoped, in part because of the inadequacies of the model upon which they were based (22) . It can similarly be argued that many systems built to provide information support for practicing clinicians have been less successful than expected because the models of clinical problem solving and clinical information seeking on which they were based were inadequate (23) . Furthermore, understanding the technical aspects and requirements of the process is not enough; one must also understand the social situation into which the technology must be integrated, to avoid creating new tensions within the local "information ecology"(24).
From the foregoing it is clear that the success of IT innovations in healthcare is in large part determined by the accuracy of the models of healthcare processes upon which these innovations are based. This is not to say that existing healthcare processes are ideal and cannot be improved upon -far from it. Rather, if healthcare processes are to be improved upon, whether through IT innovations or other interventions, these processes must first be well understood. As Woods noted at a recent U.S. national conference on medical errors, "to understand episodes of failure one had to first understand usual success-how people in their various roles learn and adapt to create safety in a world fraught with hazards, tradeoffs, and multiple goals (25) ." We therefore now turn to a discussion of the POE model, which appears to underlie discussions and implementation of POE, and compare this to some examples drawn from observations in the field.
Physician Order Entry: The Implicit Model
"Strictly speaking, POE is simply a system for direct entry of one or more types of medical orders by a physician into a system that transmits those orders electronically to the appropriate department (26) ."
Implications of the Model: the DNA model of POE
Computer-based POE systems appear to be based on a linear, step-by-step sequence for processing of orders such as that illustrated in Figure 1 . Orders originate with a physician, who uses order entry to put them into the system. Orders are then transcribed into copies that can be distributed to various departments such as laboratory, pharmacy, nursing, etc.
Departments are in turn responsible for translating these orders into executable functions such as laboratory tests, medications, treatments, or other procedures. Specialized personnel then carry out these operations, which together comprise the patient care that is provided.
The steps in the process are separate, independent, isolated and sequential. Basic computerbased POE systems tend to focus on improving the process by automating it (replacing human processing with computer processing), eliminating apparent duplication, and making improvements to individual steps. Of course, there are instances in which patient care actually does follow a linear sequence such as that depicted in the POE model in Figure 1 . It is also true that significant improvements to patient care have been achieved by providing timely decision support through computerized POE systems (27) (28) (29) . Yet, in ambulatory and hospital settings alike, the process of caring for patients is often far more complex than this model suggests. In these more complex circumstances, order entry systems based on an orderly, linear, sequential, unidirectional "DNA model" of POE can impose constraints which interfere with the multidisciplinary collaborative process that is patient care (10, 30), making it not only more difficult but potentially more dangerous.
Implications of the Language of POE
Beyond the implications of the POE model itself, there are important implications of the language that is used to describe it.
Most problematic is the term physician. The implication that physicians are the only practitioners who write orders or are the sole source of decisions about patient care is inaccurate and does injustice to the array of health professionals whose expertise and judgment are routinely brought to bear on the care of patients. Every physician knows how dependent he or she is on the knowledge and experience of nurses, pharmacists, therapists and technicians whose suggestions, corrections, and improvements to orders play such an important role in ensuring optimal care. Every patient knows how much of the care they receive takes place in the absence of and without input from a physician, deriving instead from the professional assessments and interventions of other clinicians. Referring to the process as physician order entry can create unnecessary problems by ignoring the important contributions made by other clinicians. Implementers of POE systems report anecdotally that changing the name of the system ("Clinician Order Entry or Computer Order Entry" for example) can be a helpful step toward eliminating barriers to implementation of POE systems [Ash, unpublished data] .
The term orders may also have unfortunate connotations. Healthcare has come a long way since Florence Nightingale admonished nurses to follow physicians' orders to the letter and to do nothing not authorized by the medical men. However, even Nightingale herself did not adhere to this advice, taking responsibility for the organization and provision of care and promoting and putting into practice her own ideas about nursing care and hygiene (31) (32) (33) .
Today, although the physician's role is still generally associated with ultimate responsibility and authority for patient care, this relationship is made far more complex by 1) the direct and often independent contributions of a wide variety of other health professionals; 2) the input and expectations of patients and families, whether through formal shared decision making processes or more traditional, less explicit means; and 3) the overt and covert effects of institutional, organizational, and governmental influences that comprise the milieu of contemporary practice. In a world of complex interdisciplinary care with contributions from so many diverse influences and individuals, the source of decisions about patient care may be far less clear, and the almost military connotation of orders as commands originating from a superior to be acted upon verbatim by passive and unthinking subordinates seems hardly appropriate.
Even the term entry has connotations that are potentially problematic. Information System developers might infer that entry is the sole means for initiating and communicating plans for care. This ignores the fact that plans for patient care are initiated and communicated in many ways, sometimes in multiple ways (see Box 1) . The result can be POE implementations that do not allow for other options, producing unnecessary constraints on the process of care, with potentially harmful impact on patients (34) . Physicians may assume that entry into the computer system replaces their previous means of initiating and communicating their plans, and that orders will be carried out without further action on their part. The result is reduced direct interaction among physicians, nurses, and pharmacists (30) , and increased overall reliance on the computer system. In other industries such as aviation it is well documented that mistaken assumptions about system functions can lead to problems such as "automation complacency" and "mode confusion," leading to accidents and loss of life.
Implications About Cognition and POE
A final concern about the POE model is its implicit use of an individual-level model of clinical information processing. Although multiple individuals participate in the process, their individual interactions with the POE system tend to be independent and asynchronous. For simple orders this may be sufficient. But many decisions about patient care involve interaction and negotiation among members of a group (see Box 2). POE systems designed to interact with individuals cannot facilitate, and may interfere with, such group interactions.
Similarly, to the extent that healthcare processes are examples of the sort of distributed cognition that has been documented in aviation and military settings (17) (18) (19) , POE systems founded on notions of individual cognition are likely to be constrained by this model and be unable to take advantage of the distributed processing, fault tolerance, and resilience that obtains in settings characterized by distributed cooperative problem solving (35, 36) .
Summary
We have examined how the term Physician Order Entry may be inappropriate because of 1) the inadequacy of the underlying model it implies, 2) inaccurate or unhelpful connotations of the words used, and 3) constraints imposed by application of an individual model of cognition to processes that may be better understood from a social interaction or distributed cognition framework. The difficulties that can arise as a result are not merely related to the semantics of discourse about POE, but can be deeply embedded in the semantics of the computer systems and their intended functions, resulting in unexpected consequences which at best can make patient care more difficult, and at worst may make care less safe.
Order Creation and Communication: What Really Happens
In our recent field studies of expert information use in critical care (2-4) and physician order entry in U.S. Where does the process of order creation and communication begin? Excerpts from fieldnotes in Boxes 1, 2, and 3 illustrate many of the characteristics which we believe are important parts of the process of creating, communicating, and coordinating the care of a patient. Before discussing aspects of this process, it is important to recall that description and analysis can introduce inaccuracy. Analysis requires decomposition of the process into component parts, which risks losing sight of the whole and those system properties that cannot be predicted from the properties of system components in isolation. Even description, as Hutchins observes (19) can do violence to the process, because description necessarily requires representing the process in two dimensions as a fixed linear sequence when in reality it is not. This is analogous to the Mercator projection in cartography: though useful for purposes of maritime navigation, this representation produces great distortion of reality.
With these caveats in mind, we now discuss some of the features that characterize the creation, communication, and coordination of patient care as we have observed it, and as illustrated in Boxes 1, 2, and 3.
• Patient Focus. The focus of clinicians is on the patient. Clinical activities and procedures are the means to an end, not ends in themselves. Understanding this alone can go a long way to understanding the ways in which clinicians use or ignore available tools and procedures in their work, including computer systems such as order entry.
• Care as the Product. For clinicians the goal or output of the clinical process is patient care. Other goals, such as record keeping, outcomes research, or billing, are of secondary importance. Entering orders is sometimes the first step to accomplish patient care goals, but much patient care occurs independent of order entry, and orders if they are entered at all are entered after the fact, to serve secondary aims. Written orders, then, are only an artifact of the process, and an incomplete one at that.
• Collaboration. In these excerpts (Boxes 1, 2, 3 • Multidisciplinary Contributions. Beyond the advantage of redundant processing, multidisciplinary teamwork provides a much broader base of domain knowledge and expertise that can be brought to bear on the construction of a management plan. This includes not only formal domain knowledge about what to do but also informal knowledge about how to do it and local knowledge, often not available by other means, about 'how we do it here' (39) . Working together, the plan can be constructed more efficiently than working in isolation. Xiao has described how different health professionals perceive different aspects of the same clinical event, each of them important and contributing to the overall understanding and management of the case (40).
• Distributed Processing. The cognitive load of complex tasks on individual team members is reduced by decomposing it into subtasks which are distributed among members of a group, improving the efficiency and quality of team performance (36).
• Role flexibility amplifies the effectiveness of this distributed processing, as health professionals with overlapping skills and expertise and shared understanding of goals, form a self-assembling team, actively shifting role responsibilities according to the needs of the patient and the available skill mix of the personnel on hand. In the airline industry, training in Crew Resource Management is a widely employed strategy to improve team performance by increasing role flexibility and improving communication among members of flight crews (38) .
• Simultaneous Acting and Thinking. Descriptions of the clinical process found in textbooks might suggest that care proceeds in an orderly process that begins with gathering data, through interview, then examination; followed by analysis and interpretation of the data; and finally followed by formulation of a plan, which is then carried out. But observation of clinicians reveals a far less orderly, non-linear process in which thinking and acting take place simultaneously as clinicians construct solutions to the basic questions: "What is wrong? What can be done? What will happen?"
Replanning is an essential and ongoing part of this process, incorporating the response to initial interventions and new information as it becomes available, revising and refining the management plan.
• Multidimensional Action. Many clinical activities are complex, performed for multiple reasons at the same time (overdetermined) or intended to produce multiple results or outcomes through a single action. As simple an action as taking the patient's hand can be intended as a gesture of compassion and human connection and a simultaneously be a technique for assessing temperature, muscle tone, skin turgor and fragility, etc. This list is by no means a complete or final list of properties of the process, and it does not provide us with a complete or coherent model. Rather it is meant to serve as a starting point for discussion and as a stimulus for further research. The intention is to develop more robust, more complete models of the process of care to inform the development and implementations of clinical information systems. Such systems must facilitate care without interfering with or eliminating aspects of the process that are essential to high reliability performance in the face of urgency, uncertainty, and interruptions. As we examine clinicians in the process of care, key questions to be addressed include, in our view:
• Where do ideas about care come from?
• How do these ideas become plans?
• How are these plans communicated, coordinated, and enacted?
• What are orders? What purposes do they serve?
Conclusions and Implications
Our observations in the field suggest that orders, like patient care in general, are the result of a collaborative effort, which may include patients, families, nurses, pharmacists, physicians, and others. Orders as we have observed them often originate, evolve, and are carried out Just then JF appears. Mr. H is to be his patient. JS relates the story in brief to JF, who then takes over the conversation with the nurse, the patient, and the family while JS leads the rest of the team, including myself, off to see another patient, the original reason for our coming down to the second floor.
[TN: I am unsure who eventually wrote the specific orders for Mr. H, if anyone. This was the first of countless interruptions...] Box 2.
Fieldnotes: Negotiating the Regimen
KK is unable to find a medication in the computer's list, and asks JS how to find it. JS suggests that KK call a pharmacist. KK telephones a pharmacist, who suggests a different medication. KK talks this over with the pharmacist while she finds the suggested medication in the computer, then gets instruction from the pharmacist about how to enter the order, then realizes the suggested medication is a compound she is familiar with by its contents but not by the brand name. While on the phone she asks the pharmacist which medication is preferred by the specialists on another service and works out the orders over the phone. The patient's nurse, who is now standing nearby, suggests another compound, and the R2 replies, "How do I order that?" When these conversations end, the R1 continues entering medication orders...
Box 3.
Fieldnotes: Pre-op and Post-op Critical Care L. (a critical care nurse) began her 7 p.m. shift by admitting a new patient from the Emergency Room who was to be readied for exploratory abdominal surgery. Nurses from the Unit and the ER helped move the patient onto an ICU bed. L. comforted the 94 year old woman as she replaced electrodes and switched her to the in-room cardiac monitor and oxygen supply. "I'm L., I'll be your nurse this evening. I'm sorry you're so sick. We'll take care of you, sweetheart." As she began her assessment the charge nurse entered the room and asked if she came with any papers -L. hadn't seen any. She continued her assessment asking, "where does your belly hurt?" using the in-bed scale to weigh the patient, other equipment for vital sign measures. She continually comforted the patient throughout the minor turns and procedures.
The surgeon came in, and L. greeted him. They seemed to know each other. The surgeon began asking the patient questions and told L. that the patient probably "perforated an ulcer over her pancreas." The surgeon talked to L. about "typing and crossing" her for blood, asked if she had any other labs drawn. L. asked him to put in a central line (intravenous) in surgery (easier for giving IV fluids/drugs, drawing blood, etc.) He assured her he would, and began to look for her family.
She gave the patient a slight bit of ice and obtained some cream to soothe her dry lips. She checked her pupils and obtained a Doppler to listen for pulses; she used a marking pen to mark where she heard the pulses on the patient's foot. The phlebotomist entered the room to "type and cross" and L. suggested coagulation studies and drawing extra blood for other studies that might be needed. At 7:35 L. got portable oxygen and a portable EKG monitor and hooked the patient up -ready to go. During this time the anesthesiologist entered the room. "We need her old chart." "We need an EKG." "Did you tell anyone else," L. asked? "Yes, I told respiratory." Then he went out and told the charge nurse (she and the unit secretary were "doing the orders"). He asked L. what she knew about the patient and her labs. L. asked the anesthesiologist for a central and radial artery line and he assured her he'd put them in. An EKG was done and 2 surgical personnel came for the patient; L. accompanied them as an RN escort. She reassured the patient that she'd be waiting for her upon her return from surgery.
When the patient returned the anesthesiologist came into the room, told L. she had received "Levophed;" "CVP 12 -13 so give blood slowly. NG good position, Anderson in good." "Her BUN and creatinine are up, you know." L. didn't know, and asked "how high?" They looked at the monitor readings together, then he showed her the labs on the anesthesia record -it was very small print and he jokingly offered her his glasses. "She got a few amps of bicarb and an antibiotic." The surgeon returned -"D51/2 ok (IV fluid hanging) and give her blood." The Respiratory therapist told the anesthesiologist what settings he had started with; the anesthesiologist told him to set the vent at 'whatever this lady says' -meaning L.; he then discussed the oxygen goal with the RT. "Have you seen your orders?" the charge nurse asked. L. hadn't, so they talked about some blood administration/fluid balance orders.
